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From Chapter
14: The Undermining of Capital Accumulation and Real Wages by Government Intervention (pp.
636-639)
This excerpt is taken from George Reisman, Capitalism: A Treatise
on Economics. Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996. Copyright © 1996 by George
Reisman. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without written permission
of the author. The following limited exception is granted: Namely, provided they are
reproduced in full and include this copyright notice and are made for noncommercial
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of Philosophy, Economics, and Psychology.
It is essential to realize the extent to which government intervention undermines
capital accumulation, and with it the demand for labor and the productivity of labor, and
thus real wages and the general standard of living.
The progressive personal income and inheritance taxes, and the corporate income and
capital gains taxes, are paid mainly with funds that would otherwise have been saved and
productively expended. Thus, their effect is to reduce the demand for capital goods and
the demand for labor by business enterprises, and thus to reduce the economic degree of
capitalism and the degree of capital intensiveness in the economic system. Consumption
expenditure of the government and of those to whom it gives money replaces expenditure for
capital goods and labor by business enterprises, and thus consumption expenditure of the
employees of business enterprises. In accordance with this change in demand, the existing
ability of the economic system to produce is diverted from the production of capital goods
to the production of consumers' goods, and from the production of consumers' goods that
the employees of business would have bought to the production of the consumers' goods that
the government and its employees and dependents buy. Such taxes threaten not only the
economic system's ability to progress, but even its ability to produce sufficient capital
goods to replace those that are used up in production--i.e., to remain stationary.
These taxes also greatly undermine the incentives to introduce improvements in
efficiency in the economic system, as do government subsidies, antitrust laws, prounion
legislation, environmental legislation, and government regulation in general. In all these
ways, government intervention operates to reduce output per unit of capital goods and thus
to retard capital formation by this means too. The taxes reduce the rewards of economic
success and thus discourage the efforts necessary to achieve it. At the same time,
subsidies perpetuate inefficient methods of production by sustaining their practitioners.
Thus, the taxes and the subsidies hold down the productivity of capital goods.
Furthermore, in depriving innovative small firms of the profits that would make
possible their expansion, or more rapid expansion, most of these taxes also substantially
reduce the force of competition in the economic system. They create a protective shelter
around established firms that have already accumulated substantial capital and are now
made more or less immune from the threat of new competition, since the potential
competitors are prevented from accumulating capital, or from doing so as rapidly as they
might have.86 Essentially the same analysis applies to government regulation
insofar as it is more difficult for small firms to comply with it, as when the regulations
give an advantage to firms able to afford the employment of staffs of lawyers and
accountants.
The antitrust laws stand in the way of business mergers that would achieve important
economies and thereby render production more efficient. For example, the larger firm that
results from a merger can often provide a sufficient volume of production to justify the
purchase of machinery that the smaller firms which preceded it could not, or makes it
possible to eliminate wasteful duplication in the use of existing equipment. In such ways,
mergers make possible a more efficient use of capital. Preventing them prevents such
more-efficient use of capital. In so doing, it retards capital formation.
Similarly, prounion legislation, in making it possible for the unions to prevent or
delay the introduction of labor-saving machinery and more-efficient work practices, holds
down the total output that otherwise could be produced in the economic system by the same
quantity of labor working with the existing quantity of capital goods. In so doing, it
holds down the size of the output that is available to meet whatever relative demand may
exist for capital goods. So-called environmental legislation likewise provides numerous
examples of reducing output per unit of capital goods, such as depriving the capital and
labor employed in the energy industry of its most productive uses by closing off vast
territories to the very possibility of exploration and development, and imposing all
manner of regulations on business in general that require the employment of additional
capital and labor to accomplish a given result. All such regulations needlessly reduce
output per unit both of labor and of existing capital goods, while correspondingly
increasing costs per unit.87 Indeed, in some cases business firms must invest
once in order to produce their products, and the equivalent of a second time in order to
be in compliance with the government regulations inspired by the pathological fears of the
environmentalists.
Every government regulation, of whatever description, that needlessly raises costs,
correspondingly reduces the output of the economic system and thus the efficiency with
which existing capital goods are employed. This conclusion follows from the proposition
established back in Chapter 6 that reductions in unit cost underlie increases in output in
the economic system, by virtue of releasing labor and capital to produce more either of
the good whose unit cost is reduced or of other goods.88 The corollary of this
proposition is that increases in unit cost operate to reduce output in the economic
system. Both propositions also follow from the fact that with any given magnitude of
aggregate productive expenditure [i.e., expenditure for capital goods and labor by
business firms], average unit cost in the economic system as a whole varies in inverse
proportion to output.
Indeed, given any definite magnitude of aggregate productive expenditure, the only way
that average unit cost in the economic system can increase is by virtue of aggregate
production correspondingly decreasing, for average unit cost in the economic system as a
whole is aggregate productive expenditure divided by aggregate output. By the laws
of mathematics, with a numerator that is fixed, the only way that a fractional expression
can increase is by virtue of a corresponding decrease in the denominator, which in this
case is aggregate output. Thus, any government regulation that raises average unit costs
in the economic system is accompanied by a corresponding reduction in aggregate output.
The consequence of any lesser overall ability to produce is, of course, a reduced
ability to produce capital goods, as well as consumers' goods. More precisely, the effect
of all such regulations is to reduce the ratio of output to the capital goods consumed in
producing that output, and therefore to make the maintenance proportion unnecessarily
high. When placed together with the taxes described a few paragraphs back, the combined
effect is a lower relative production of capital goods and a higher maintenance
proportion, with a corresponding two-sided reduction in the portion of output available
for new capital formation. Indeed, that portion can be eliminated altogether, and
stagnation or outright capital decumulation made to take the place of capital
accumulation.
Government budget deficits and social security, like the taxes I have described, also
operate to reduce saving and productive expenditure. To the extent the deficits are
financed by borrowing from the public (as opposed to the printing of money), they
represent a diversion of savings from use as capital to the financing of the government's
consumption. To the extent they are financed by the creation of money, they operate to
create both additional nominal profits, on which businesses must pay taxes, and to raise
the replacement cost of capital assets. Thus, they operate to make it more difficult or
even impossible to replace capital assets. And in still other ways, inflation-financed
deficits undermine capital formation.89 Social security leads people to reduce
their provision for the future, in the belief that their needs will be provided for by the
government. Meanwhile the government consumes their social security contributions. Thus,
in this way too, capital accumulation is undermined.90
In the face of such an assault on the foundations of capital formation, it should
hardly be surprising that the present-day United States has fallen from its previous
position of unchallenged economic eminence. The United States is a country whose economic
foundations have been sapped by wave after wave of socialistically motivated assaults on
capital formation. In this century, there has been the Progressive Era and the Square
Deal, then the New Deal, the Fair Deal, and the Great Society, all bent on fundamentally
altering the nature of the American economic system and, unfortunately, succeeding in
doing so. Until these policies, and the envy- and resentment-filled mentality on which
they are based, are reversed, the United States will continue on its path of decline.
What is required to restore economic progress and rising real wages in the United
States is nothing less than radical reductions in government spending, taxation, and
government regulation of business. Specifically, what is necessary is to begin phasing out
the progressive personal income and inheritance taxes, the corporate income tax, the
capital gains tax, the social security system, and the whole of the welfare state, which
makes the revenues raised by these destructive taxes appear necessary, and, at the same
time, to move toward a gold standard and the end of the arbitrary creation of money. Such
a program, coupled with an equally massive reduction in government regulation, would
enormously increase not just the incentive and means to save, which would be important
enough, but all of the incentives to produce and compete. People would work harder
and produce more in the knowledge that more of what they earned was theirs to keep. More
new companies would be started and be able to grow rapidly and challenge the established
firms, if they could plow back most of their profits. All firms would improve in
efficiency if they were free of restrictive regulations. The rate of innovation and
technological progress would increase. Thus, along with a sharp rise in the relative
production of capital goods, the productivity of capital goods would greatly increase and
the maintenance proportion correspondingly decrease. This combination of a higher relative
production of capital goods and reduced maintenance proportion would assure a sharply
higher rate of capital accumulation. It would thus restore a rising productivity of labor
and rising real wages. (And, of course, real wages would increase on the strength of a
rise in the demand for labor made possible by the reduction in government spending, taxes,
and deficits.) This is clearly the path to the long-term economic recovery of the United
States (or any other country). The effect would be to lift the United States out of the
stagnation of the last generation and restore it to rapid economic progress--to rapidly
rising real wage rates and a rapidly rising general standard of living.
Regrettably, so powerful is the grip of ignorance and envy, that no amount of economic
decline by itself seems likely to awaken the present generation of Americans to the fact
that they, their twentieth-century political heroes, and their present chosen leaders
might in any way be responsible for the decline through the economic policies they support
and sustain, and that what is required is the radical reversal of those policies.
Following the completion of my economic analysis, the final chapter of this book will
attempt to develop a concrete, long-range political-economic program and strategy for
achieving the necessary changes.
Happily, a leading implication of the analysis of capital accumulation I
have presented here is that it is never too late for such a program. For what I have shown
is that while no amount of existing capital goods and prosperity, however great, is a
guarantee of the maintenance of those capital goods and prosperity, so too it is possible
even for the very poorest of countries to rise, or for a country to resume its rise no
matter how great its fall from former prosperity. All that is necessary is that it become
more efficient in the use of whatever capital goods it continues to possess, and devote a
proportion of them and of its labor to the production of further capital goods that is
greater than the maintenance proportion. It is highly unlikely that the economic decline
the United States may experience in the coming decades will place it below the level of
Japan in 1950. But even if that were the case, it would still be possible for the United
States rapidly to reverse the damage and, before too long, to exceed its former peak and
go on advancing from there. To do so, it would simply have to turn once again to the
philosophy of economic freedom on which it was built. That would ensure both the necessary
efficiency in the use of whatever capital goods existed and a sufficient concentration on
the production of further capital goods.
Notes
86. Cf. Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (1944; reprint ed., New Rochelle, N. Y.:
Arlington House, 1969), pp. 1314.
87. See above, pp. 9899. The hampering of the energy industry is an example of the
wider phenomenon of the environmental movement's systematic thwarting of efforts to
overcome the operation of the law of diminishing returns in agriculture and mining. On
this point, see above, pp. 316317.
88. See above, pp. 178179.
89. On the subject of the undermining of capital formation by inflation, see below, pp.
930937.
90. Concerning social security, see above, pp. 2223.
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