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From Chapter
18: The Marginal-Efficiency-of-Capital Doctrine's Reversal of the Actual Relationship
Between Net Investment and the Rate of Profit (pp. 882-883)
This excerpt is taken from George Reisman, Capitalism: A Treatise
on Economics. Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books, 1996. Copyright © 1996 by George
Reisman. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without written permission
of the author. The following limited exception is granted: Namely, provided they are
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We are now in a position to make what is perhaps the most decisive objection of all to
the declining-marginal-efficiency-of-capital doctrine and the Keynesian analysis. And that
is that our discussion of the determinants of the rate of profit has shown that the rate
of profit and net investment are positively related. We have seen that net
investment and profits move together virtually dollar for dollar, because while profits
are the difference between sales revenue and costs, net investment is the difference
between productive expenditure (which is almost equivalent to sales revenue) and those
same costs.40 [Productive expenditure is the expenditure by business firms for
capital goods and labor. Net investment equals productive expenditure minus costs, i.e.,
the difference between the additions to business assets constituted by productive
expenditures for plant and equipment and inventory and work in progress, and the
subtractions constituted by depreciation cost and cost of goods sold.]
Thus, the actual reason the rate of profit is so low or negative in a depression is the
same as the reason net investment is so low or negative--namely, that productive
expenditure has fallen, taking sales revenue with it, while costs, especially depreciation
costs, fall only with a lag. By the same token, in the recovery from a depression net
investment and the rate of profit both improve together. For every dollar by which
productive expenditure rises relative to costs, creating net investment, sales revenues
rise relative to those same costs, creating profits. Likewise, for every dollar by which
costs fall relative to productive expenditure, also creating net investment, those same
costs fall relative to sales revenues, creating profits. The mathematical implication of
this virtual dollar-for-dollar equivalence between additional net investment and
additional profits is that the rate of profit--the so-called marginal efficiency of
capital--must actually rise with the rise in net investment, and not fall as the
Keynesians maintain.
For example, if in the depths of a depression, aggregate profit in the economic system
is 10, while total accumulated capital is 1,000, then the average rate of profit is a mere
1 percent. But if now net investment increases by, say, 50, then aggregate profit
increases from 10 to 60. At the same time, of course, the total accumulated capital of the
economic system rises to 1,050. The average capital outstanding over the period becomes
1,025--viz., the average of 1,000 and 1,050. However much it may come as a shock to the
Keynesians, the unavoidable implication of these facts is that the average rate of profit
rises from 1 percent to almost 6 percent! What happens mathematically is exactly the same
sort of thing as happens to the season average of a baseball team that goes on a winning
streak. In the case of the baseball team, its season average rises in the direction of
1,000. A thousand is its average over the course of its winning streak--its marginal
average so to speak--and thus its season average rises accordingly. In the case of more
net investment and equivalently more profit, the average rate of profit rises in the
direction of a mathematical limit of 200 percent, for the additional net investment is
accompanied by an equivalent addition to the amount of profit and by an addition only half
as great to the average capital outstanding in the economic system.
As indicated, the rise in the rate of profit that must accompany more net investment in
the recovery from a depression, has its counterpart in the fall in the rate of profit that
accompanies the wiping out of net investment in the descent into a depression. In the
latter case, the plunge in productive expenditure not only drives productive expenditure
below costs, making net investment negative, but equivalently reduces sales revenues
relative to the same costs. This drives profit in the economic system below net
consumption. Profit comes to equal net consumption plus a negative net investment
component.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it is difficult to imagine a more erroneous
conception of things than the Keynesian notion that the rate of profit is at a depression
level because of too much net investment and that the further net investment that must
accompany recovery from the depression will drive it still lower. The facts are that the
rate of profit is low in a depression for the same reasons that net investment is low--to
the point of being negative--and will rise with the rise in net investment. In other
words, among the changes that would need to be made in the Keynesian analysis, if for some
reason one had any wish to retain it, is a reversal of the slope of the so-called mec
and IS curves in the context of recovery from a depression and the reestablishment
of full employment. But since the Keynesian system is so thoroughly riddled with errors
and contradictions, there is no point in attempting to modify it or retain it in any way.
The Keynesian analysis is so wrong that it is beyond redemption. The one, fundamental
change that is needed is its total abandonment.
Notes
40. Again, see above, ibid. See also above, pp. 723725 and 744750.
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